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NOTES
THE RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT
CIVIL LITIGANTS: THE DEMANDS OF DUE PROCESS
The United States Supreme Court has held that the right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel, guaranteed by the sixth amendment
and incorporated by the fourteenth amendment, requires states to
provide counsel to indigent criminal defendants before imprisoning
them.1 In Gideon v. Wainwright,2 the Court overturned Betts v.
Brady,3 which held that, in some cases, due process might not re-
quire appointed counsel for indigent criminal defendants. The de-
cision rested on the important liberty interest each person has in
his own physical liberty, due process, and fundamental fairness.
Protecting these interests requires that the accused have counsel
before the state deprives him of his liberty.
In subsequent decisions involving juvenile proceedings,4 parole
revocation, 5 and the termination of parental rights," the Court in-
dicated that the right to appointed counsel could, in certain cir-
cumstances, extend to civil proceedings. In such cases, the right to
appointed counsel is grounded not in the sixth amendment, but in
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.7
With civil proceedings, however, the Court did not adopt the per
se approach that it employed in criminal cases. Instead, the Court
held that the decision whether due process requires the appoint-
ment of counsel in civil actions must be a case-by-case determina-
1. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
4. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
5. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
6. Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
7. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 ("No state shall... deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law .... ).
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tion.8 In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,9 the Court
went even further, holding that a presumption exists against re-
quiring appointed counsel when an unsuccessful litigant cannot be
deprived of his personal liberty. Based on Lassiter, then, when an
indigent civil litigant could not possibly be deprived of his personal
liberty as a direct result of the litigation, the Constitution does not
require, in the absence of special and compelling circumstances,
the appointment of counsel.
This Note evaluates whether the Court's stance is justified. First,
the Note examines state and lower federal court decisions to deter-
mine when due process requires appointed counsel for indigent
civil litigants. The due process requirement may be grounded in
either the federal or state constitutions, or statutes. Second, after
determining when courts have required appointed counsel, the
Note analyzes the factors present in those cases.
The Note concludes that the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment does not require appointed counsel in all civil
cases. This Note will show, however, that in certain cases, the
Lassiter presumption should be reversed. When the state is in re-
ality the opposing party and when the interests of the indigent liti-
gant, although not involving his personal liberty, are fundamental
and compelling, due process and fundamental fairness require a
presumption in favor of appointed counsel. Cases included in this
category are proceedings to terminate parental rights and paternity
actions. To overcome this presumption, the state must show that,
due to the particular legal and factual issues of the case, providing
counsel for the indigent civil litigant will make no difference in the
outcome of the litigation. This presumption should be a strong one
and should place a heavy burden on the state to produce substan-
tial evidence to rebut it.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL
In Gideon v. Wainwright,0 the United States Supreme Court
applied the right to counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment to
8. The Court adopted the totality-of-the-circumstances approach in the criminal context
in Betts and subsequently overruled it in Gideon.
9. 452 U.S. at 26-27.
10. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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the states, via the fourteenth amendment." The Court in Gideon
held that the right to counsel for a criminal defendant is funda-
mental, and that "any person haled into court, who is too poor to
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is pro-
vided for him."'12
In subsequent decisions, the Court clarified the Gideon holding.
In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 3 the Court made it clear that the grad-
ing of the offense was not the determinative factor of whether due
process required the appointment of counsel. 4 Argersinger was
convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, a crime punishable
under Florida law by imprisonment for up to six months or a
$1000 fine, or both.15 The Court held that "absent a knowing and
intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense,
whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was
represented by counsel at his trial.' 6
The Court modified this holding in Scott v. Illinois," which re-
stricted Argersinger to cases in which the defendant was actually
imprisoned as a result of his conviction.' Scott was convicted of
shoplifting merchandise valued at less than $150. The Illinois stat-
ute provided for a maximum penalty of a $500 fine or one year in
jail, or both. Upon conviction, Scott received only a $50 fine. Scott
argued that he was entitled to appointed counsel because impris-
onment was authorized, regardless of whether the court actually
imposed such a sentence.'9 The Court held, however, that the
sixth 20 and fourteenth amendments require the appointment of
11. Id. at 339. A Florida state court convicted Gideon of breaking and entering to commit
a misdemeanor, a felony under Florida law. The trial court refused to appoint counsel for
Gideon, stating that under Florida law, counsel was available only to a person charged with
a capital offense. Id. at 336-37.
12. 372 U.S. at 344 (emphasis added).
13. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
14. Id. at 34.
15. Id. at 26.
16. Id. at 37.
17. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
18. Id. at 374.
19. Id. at 368.
20. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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counsel only if a court actually sentences an indigent criminal de-
fendant to a term of imprisonment.2
In In re Gault,2 2 a civil proceeding, the Court indicated that the
defendant's interest in his personal freedom, and not simply the
special sixth and fourteenth amendment right to counsel in crimi-
nal cases, triggered the right to appointed counsel.23 The Court in-
dicated that the right to appointed counsel could extend beyond
criminal cases to civil cases. In the former, the right was rooted in
the sixth amendment; in the latter, the right derived from the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
2
'
The Court examined the fourteenth amendment in Gagnon v.
Scarpelli.25 Scarpelli's parole was revoked after he was appre-
hended committing a burglary with another felon. Scarpelli con-
tended that he should have had appointed counsel at the parole
revocation hearing. However, the Court declined to adopt a per se
rule for such situations. Instead, the Court held that the need for
appointed counsel must be determined on a case-by-case basis;2 6 in
some cases, fundamental fairness would require appointed counsel
for indigent probationers.
The Court first considered the right to counsel under the four-
teenth amendment in proceedings to terminate parental rights in
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services.2 8 Lassiter involved a
termination proceeding in which the indigent parent had not been
represented by counsel. The Court held that as a litigant's interest
in personal liberty diminishes, so does his right to appointed coun-
21. 440 U.S. at 373-74.
22. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
23. Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981).
24. In re Gault concerned a juvenile proceeding. The Court held that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment required that in proceedings which may result in the
juvenile's confinement to an institution the juvenile has a right to appointed counsel even
though the proceedings may be labeled civil and not criminal. 387 U.S. at 49-50.
25. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
26. Id. at 790.
27. Id. The Court "presumed" that a court should appoint counsel at a probationer's re-
quest, based on a timely and colorable claim that he has not committed the violation of
which he is accused, or that, even if he does not contest that the violation occurred, substan-
tial reasons justify or mitigate the violation and the reasons are complex or otherwise diffi-
cult to present. A court should also consider whether the probationer appears to be capable
of speaking for himself. Id. at 790-91.
28. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
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sel.29 Furthermore, an indigent litigant is presumed to have a right
to appointed counsel only when a loss on the merits would deprive
him of his personal liberty. Courts were to measure the other ele-
ments in the due process decision against the presumption that the
defendant is not entitled to appointed counsel.30
The Court applied the test used in Mathews v. Eldridge3' to de-
termine the "specific dictates of due process. 3 2 The Eldridge test
required the consideration of three factors: 3 the private interests
at stake, the government's interest,34 and the risk that the proce-
dures used will lead to erroneous results. Analyzing these factors,
the Court stated that in a proceeding to terminate parental rights
the parent's interest is an extremely important one because of the
fundamental nature of the parent-child relationship. 35 The Court
then analyzed the government's interest, finding that the state
shares the parent's interest in a correct decision, has a weak pecu-
niary interest, and, in some cases, has a strong interest in main-
taining the informality of the proceedings. Finally, the complexity
of the proceedings and the inability of the parent to present her
own case could make the risk of an erroneous determination unac-
ceptably high."
In balancing the interests involved, the Court said that when the
parent's interest was at its strongest, the state's interest was at its
weakest, and the risks of error were at their peak, the presumption
against the appointment of counsel would be overcome. Due pro-
cess, therefore, would require the appointment of counsel.37 The
Court indicated, however, that the Constitution did not require the
29. Id. at 26.
30. Id. at 27.
31. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
32. Id. at 335.
33. Id.
34. In Eldridge, a case involving the entitlement to Social Security benefits, the Court
said that the government's interest included the administrative burden and other costs to
society of affording the additional due process protection. Id. at 347. In Lassiter, the Court
said that in addition to its economic interest, the government had an interest in the welfare
of the child. 452 U.S. at 27.
35. A parent's right to the custody of her children is an important interest that warrants
deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. 452 U.S. at 27 (citing
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
36. Id. at 31.
37. Id.
6311989]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
appointment of counsel in every termination proceeding. The trial
court should therefore determine, based on the Eldridge factors,
whether due process requires the appointment of counsel.38
These cases suggest that whether due process requires appointed
counsel for indigent civil litigants does not depend on the particu-
lar type of civil action involved. Instead, the specific facts and cir-
cumstances present in each individual case will determine what
due process requires.
CIVIL CASES IN WHICH LITIGANTS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO ESTABLISH
A RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL
Proceedings to Terminate Parental Rights
Both before and after Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,
state courts have often considered the right to counsel for indigent
civil litigants in actions to terminate parental rights. Courts have
reached different results, some relying on the federal or state con-
stitutions to mandate furnished counsel,39 and others relying on
statutes to reach the same result.40 Other cases have rejected an
absolute requirement of appointing counsel in this type of proceed-
ing, instead choosing to decide the issue on a case-by-case basis.41
Finally, at least one court has flatly refused to recognize the right
of a civil indigent litigant to counsel in a proceeding to terminate
parental rights.42
In In re Welfare of Luscier,43 the Supreme Court of Washington
held that in a termination proceeding, the due process clauses of
the fourteenth amendment and the Washington Constitution man-
dated the parent's right to counsel.44 The court cited two factors in
38. Id. at 31-32.
39. See infra notes 43-66 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
43. 84 Wash. 2d 135, 524 P.2d 906 (1974). Accord Danforth v. State Dep't of Health &
Welfare, 303 A.2d 794 (Me. 1973) (citing ME. CONST. art. I, § 6: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself and his counsel, or either, at his
election .. "); In re Friesz, 190 Neb. 347, 208 N.W.2d 259 (1973); State v. Jamison, 251 Or.
114, -, 444 P.2d 15, 17 (1968) ("where the parent in a termination proceeding is indigent,
counsel must be supplied at public expense.").
44. 84 Wash. 2d at 138, 524 P.2d at 908. See WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 3 ("No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
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its decision. First, the court recognized that parental rights were a
liberty interest that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment protected. The court stated that, due to the funda-
mental nature of this interest, the "full panoply of due process
safeguards applies '45 to such proceedings. Second, the court em-
phasized that in a termination proceeding, a parent does not con-
front an opposing party with similar skills, but rather an attorney
hired by the state. To demonstrate the importance of this fact, the
court cited a study indicating that the presence of counsel in ter-
mination proceedings results in a significantly lower percentage of
court findings against the parent.46 The court stated that the lack
of counsel, in itself, may lead to the unwarranted deprivation of
parental rights.47
In In re Adoption of R.L,45 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held that an indigent mother was entitled to appointed counsel.
The court said that an individual is entitled to counsel in any pro-
ceeding that may lead to the loss of substantial rights, and found
that parental rights were substantial rights. 49 The decision rested
on a strong policy: when the state was represented by counsel,
forcing a parent to defend herself without an attorney who could
test the state's case by the rules of evidence and cross-examination
would be grossly unfair.50
In In re D.B.,51 the Supreme Court of Florida reached a similar
conclusion-in proceedings involving the permanent deprivation of
parental rights, the due process clauses of the Constitution and the
45. 84 Wash. 2d at 137, 524 P.2d at 908.
46. Id. (citing Note, Representation in Child Neglect Cases: Are Parents Neglected?, 4
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 230, 241-43 (1968)).
47. Id. at 138, 524 P.2d at 908. Luscier involved only proceedings that would result in
permanent termination of parental rights. In In re Myricks, 85 Wash. 2d 252, 533 P.2d 841
(1975), the Supreme Court of Washington, using a similar rationale, extended the right to
appointed counsel to proceedings in which the loss of custody is temporary, but permanent
deprivation may likely follow. Id. at 253, 533 P.2d at 841.
48. 455 Pa. 29, 312 A.2d 601 (1973).
49. Id. at , 312 A.2d at 602.
50. Id. at -, 312 A.2d at 603. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has noted, however,
that R.L may no longer be good law. See Corra v. Coil, 305 Pa. Super. 179, - n.7, 451 A.2d
480, 485 n.7 (1982). If R.L was based on federal grounds, then Lassiter v. Department of
Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981), may have overruled it. 305 Pa. Super. at - n.7, 451 A.2d
at 485 n.7.
51. 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
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Florida Constitution52 required the appointment of counsel. The
court noted that generally the right to appointed counsel depended
on the nature of the proceedings.53 According to the court, the
right to counsel in termination proceedings is governed by due pro-
cess considerations rather than by the sixth amendment as in
criminal cases. Again, the extent of procedural due process re-
quired in this specific type of action varies with the character of
the parent's interest and the nature of the proceedings. Here, due
process required the appointed counsel when the proceedings could
result in permanent termination."
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, in State ex rel.
Lemaster v. Oakley,55 held that a minimum standard of due pro-
cess requires appointed counsel for indigent parents faced with
charges of neglect and the potential for permanent termination of
parental rights. The court cited the following reasons for its deci-
sion: the complexity of the charges against allegedly neglectful par-
ents; the resources available to the state as the opposing party; the
potential that the parents' testimony may be used against them in
a criminal proceeding; and the fundamental nature of the parents'
right to the custody and companionship of their children.5
52. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property with-
out due process of law. . .
53. 385 So. 2d at 89.
54. Id. at 90. The court also required appointed counsel when the proceedings could lead
to criminal child abuse charges. Id. The court declined, however, to require appointed coun-
sel in all dependency cases, irrespective of whether the deprivation was permanent or tem-
porary. Rather, the court reaffirmed its decision in Potvin v. Keller, 313 So. 2d 703 (Fla.
1975), which listed several factors for determining whether to appoint counsel when no
threat of permanent termination exists: (1) the potential length of the separation, (2) the
degree of restrictions on parental visitation, (3) the presence or absence of parental consent,
(4) the presence or absence of disputed facts, and (5) the complexity of the proceedings in
terms of witnesses and documents. 385 So. 2d at 83, 90. The court further held that when
permanent termination may result, a court must appoint counsel for (1) the natural mother
or divorced indigent parents of the child, (2) the natural mother of an illegitimate child, and
(3) the natural indigent father of an illegitimate child when he has legally recognized or is in
fact maintaining the child. Id. at 91.
55. 157 W. Va. 590, 203 S.E.2d 140 (1974).
56. Id. at 599, 203 S.E.2d at 145.
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In V.F. v. State,57 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that, based
on the Alaska Constitution,58 indigent parents were guaranteed
court-appointed counsel in proceedings to terminate parental
rights. 59 Citing a previous decision, the court found that the "'in-
terest at stake ... is one of the most basic of all civil liberties, the
right to direct the upbringing of one's child.' -26
The Supreme Court of Michigan extended, in a sense, the right
to counsel in Reist v. Bay County Circuit Judge,"1 holding that the
due process clause required court-appointed counsel for indigent
parents involved in termination proceedings.6 2 The court then held
that the equal protection clauses of the Constitution and the Mich-
igan Constitution 63 required appointed counsel for indigent par-
ents pursuing their first appeal as of right. 4 The court noted that
parents who retained counsel were entitled to have such counsel
represent them on appeal. To deny representation to indigent par-
ents on their appeal as of right would violate equal protection:
Persons of means can fully exercise the statutory and constitu-
tional avenues of appeal. The failure to provide poor persons an
effective and meaningful appeal of a decision terminating their
parental rights through the assignment of appellate counsel is a
particularly invidious deprivation and distasteful reminder of
their poverty. "[I]t is now fundamental that, once established,
these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that
can only impede open and equal access to the courts. '6 5
57. 666 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1983).
58. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.").
59. 666 P.2d at 45.
60. Id. (quoting Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893, 895 (Alaska 1979) (holding that the Alaska
Constitution guaranteed the right to court-appointed counsel in private child custody pro-
ceedings when the opposing party was represented by counsel provided by a public agency)).
The court recognized in V.F. that Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981),
held that the Constitution did not grant an automatic right to counsel for parents during
such proceedings. The Alaska Supreme Court decided, however, to join the "growing num-
ber of jurisdictions which have held that the right to counsel in termination proceedings
exists under the state constitution." 666 P.2d at 45 n.3.
61. 396 Mich. 326, 241 N.W.2d 55 (1976).
62. Id. at 346, 241 N.W.2d at 64.
63. MICH. CONsT. art I, § 2. ("No person shall be denied the equal protection of the
laws . . ").
64. 396 Mich. at 349, 241 N.W.2d at 65.
65. Id. at 348, 241 N.W.2d at 65 (quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966)).
1989] 635
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The court concluded that the state's failure to provide counsel in
this circumstance meant "'an unconstitutional line ha[d] been
drawn between rich and poor.' ")66
Apart from case law, several states have statutes that mandate
appointed counsel for indigent parents during termination pro-
ceedings. 7 Based on such statutes, courts have held that the right
to court-appointed counsel extends to appeals. In Chambers v.
District Court,6 8 parental rights were terminated at a hearing in
which appointed counsel, as provided by an Iowa statute, repre-
sented the indigent parent.6 9 The mother attempted to appeal the
decision to the district court and asked the court to appoint coun-
sel. The court denied her motion.
In reversing the district court's denial of counsel, the Supreme
Court of Iowa pointed out that although common law granted no
right of appeal, the legislature could provide for an appeal if it saw
fit.70 Once the legislature has granted the right to appeal, however,
such a right must apply equally to all." The court concluded that
the legislature had intended to offer all persons who came before a
juvenile court a full review on appeal. Nothing in the statute pro-
vided that the right to court-appointed counsel excluded appeals.
Noting that when authorizing the appeal, the legislature must have
known that such an appeal would require counsel, the court held
66. Id. at 349, 241 N.W.2d at 65 (quoting Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963)).
Accord In re B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972):
A parent's concern for the liberty of the child, as well as for his care and
control, involves too fundamental an interest and right. . ., to be relinquished
to the State without the opportunity for a hearing, with assigned counsel if the
parent lacks the means to retain a lawyer. To deny legal assistance under such
circumstances would... constitute a violation of his due process rights and in
light of the express statutory provision for legal representation for those who
can afford it, a denial of equal protection of the laws as well.
Id. at 356-57, 285 N.E.2d at 290, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 136 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
67. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 232 (West 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.28 (West 1985); see
also MICH. CT. R. 5.974(H).
68. 261 Iowa 31, 152 N.W.2d 818 (1967).
69. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.28 (West 1985).
70. 261 Iowa at 33, 152 N.W.2d at 820.
71. Id. Section 232.28 of the Iowa Code guaranteed the mother's right to appeal.
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that the right to counsel would continue through appeals that the
state authorized. 2
The cases described above adopted an absolute rule, based on
either constitutional or statutory grounds, that indigent parents
have the right to court-appointed counsel in a termination pro-
ceeding. However, some courts have declined to adopt such an ab-
solute right and have held, instead, that whether due process re-
quires court-appointed counsel should be a case-by-case
determination.
In Cleaver v. Wilcox,7 3 plaintiffs brought a class action seeking
to enjoin state authorities from proceeding with termination ac-
tions without first supplying counsel to indigent parents. The dis-
trict court granted the injunction. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding no irreparable harm to
the plaintiffs.7 4 The court proposed a three-factor analysis to de-
termine whether due process required the appointment of counsel.
The first factor was the length of the separation that could result
from the proceedings. The greater the length of the separation and
the higher the probability of removal of the child, the greater the
need for appointed counsel. The second factor was the presence or
absence of parental consent or of disputed facts. The final factor
was the parent's ability to cope with documents and examine wit-
nesses. The greater the complexity of the case, the more pressing
the need for counsel. 75 The court emphasized that a court refusing
a request for appointed counsel must set forth in the record the
grounds for refusal in order to permit review.76 Due process re-
quired appointed counsel "whenever an indigent parent, unable to
present his or her case properly, faces a substantial possibility of
the loss of custody or of prolonged separation from a child. 77
72. 261 Iowa at 35, 152 N.W.2d at 821. See Sanchez v. Walker County Dep't of Family &
Children Servs., 237 Ga. 406, 229 S.E.2d 66 (1976); In re C.P., 463 So. 2d 899 (La. Ct. App.
1985).
73. 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974).
74. Id. at 945-46. The court also noted that because of subsequent legislation, the named
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The Supreme Court of Montana applied this test in In re
M.D.Y.R., 8 in which an indigent mother who was not represented
by counsel at a hearing lost custody of her child for six months.7 9
The court found that due process did not require the appointment
of counsel because the loss of custody was merely temporary, the
mother had liberal visitation rights, and the state agency would
return custody to the mother in less than six months if conditions
improved. The court also noted that the mother did not dispute
the facts or "necessarily oppose the proposal."80 Based on the un-
contested nature of the proceedings, the court believed that the
assistance of counsel would have had no effect on the outcome.
Some courts have found no constitutional right to appointed
counsel in termination proceedings. In In re Blake C.,1 parents
had abandoned the child for at least six months and foster parents
had cared for the child for two years.8 2 On petition by the foster
parents, the trial court permanently terminated the parental rights
of the natural parents. The mother appealed, contending that in
termination proceedings indigent parents have a due process right
to counsel.83
The California Court of Appeals first noted that the United
States Supreme Court had found no federal due process right to
appointed counsel in termination proceedings. 4 The court of ap-
peals then said that the California Supreme Court had recognized
a due process right to counsel in only two cases: "when an indigent
prisoner is threatened with a judicially sanctioned deprivation of
property and the trial court determines that his right to a mean-
ingful opportunity to be heard requires the appointment of coun-
sel,"'8 5 and in a paternity action the state prosecuted. 6
78. 177 Mont. 516, 582 P.2d 758 (1978).
79. Id. at -, 582 P.2d at 761.
80. Id. at -, 582 P.2d at 765.
81. 178 Cal. App. 3d 608, 224 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1986).
82. Id. at _-, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
83. Id. at - 224 Cal. Rptr. at 172, 177.
84. Id. at -, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 177 (citing Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452
U.S. 18 (1981)).
85. Id. at _, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 177-78 (citing Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553
P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976)).
86. Id. at , 224 Cal. Rptr. at 178 (citing Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154
Cal. Rptr. 529, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979)). Because the foster parents, rather than
[Vol. 30:627
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The court of appeals noted the fundamental nature of the
parenting right and the consequences of the permanent termina-
tion of the parent-child relationship. However, the court said that
"a parent's liberty interest in his or her child has thus far not been
equated with an individual's liberty interest in freedom from un-
justified confinement. 8 7 The court held that the California Consti-
tution did not require appointed counsel in termination
proceedings.s8
The divergent results in these cases indicate that a better rule
concerning the right of a civil indigent litigant to court-appointed
counsel in proceedings to terminate parental rights is needed. One
solution is to reverse the Lassiter presumption against appointed
counsel and apply a presumption in favor of appointing counsel.
When the parent contests the action, the state should appoint
counsel unless it can show that, due to the particular legal and fac-
tual issues involved, the presence of counsel will have no effect on
the outcome of the proceeding. Requiring appointed counsel in
each case would probably go further than is absolutely necessary
because undoubtedly in some cases the presence of counsel would
do nothing to change the outcome. Given the state's role as the
opposing party and the fundamental interests involved, however,
the state should bear the burden of demonstrating why counsel
should not be appointed. If the trial judge decides that the state
has met its burden, he must put the reasons for his finding in the
record to permit appellate review.
Paternity Actions
Another frequently litigated area involving the right to ap-
pointed counsel is paternity actions. Again, courts treat the right
to counsel in these actions in a variety of ways. Some courts hold
that due process requires appointed counsel if, as is often the
the state, brought this action, In re Blake C. may be distinguished from many of the prior
cases.
87. Id. at , 224 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
88. Id. at , 224 Cal. Rptr. at 178. The Maryland Court of Appeals reached the same
result in In re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968), although the opposing party in that
case was a state agency. See also In re Delaney, 617 P.2d 886, 889 (Okla. 1980) ("In de-
prived-status proceedings, a parent has no constitutional right to a state-provided lawyer.").
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case,"9 the state prosecutes the action. Other courts analyze the is-
sue on a case-by-case basis, and others have held that no right
exists.
In Salas v. Cortez,90 an action prosecuted by the district attor-
ney's office, the court found an indigent man to be the father of a
child and ordered him to pay child support. The father was not
represented by counsel at the hearing."1 The California Supreme
Court reversed, holding that when a state prosecutes a paternity
action, the fourteenth amendment and the California Constitu-
tion 92 require that the court appoint counsel for an indigent de-
fendant.9 3 To determine what process was due, the court examined
the nature and the importance of the interests involved, the possi-
ble consequences that the putative father would face, and the fea-
tures that distinguish paternity actions from other civil proceed-
ings. The court balanced the factors against the state interests.9 4 In
analyzing the three factors, the California court noted that the de-
termination of paternity had serious implications for the alleged
father, the child, the mother, and the state. The court recalled that
it had recognized previously that the interest in maintaining a par-
ent-child relationship was a compelling one, and said that the
"[f]reedom from an incorrect imposition of that relationship on ei-
ther a parent or a child is an equally compelling interest."9' 5
In addition, the court noted that several results flowed from an
adjudication of paternity. First, an adjudication of paternity could
seriously affect the lives of all the persons involved and would ex-
pose the alleged father to deprivation of property and, potentially,
liberty.9 s Second, a judgment of paternity is res judicata in any
89. Federal law requires that states receiving funds for Aid to Families with Dependent
Children enforce support obligations. 42 U.S.C. § 654 (1982).
90. 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1979).
91. Id. at 25, 593 P.2d at 228, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
92. CAL. CO NST. art. I, § 7(a) ("A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law ....").
93. 24 Cal. 3d at 26-27, 34, 593 P.2d at 229, 234, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 532, 537.
94. Id. at 27, 593 P.2d at 230, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
95. Id. at 28, 593 P.2d at 230, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
96. Id. The court noted that an adjudication of paternity would obligate the alleged fa-
ther to support and educate the child, an obligation that would not end at the child's major-
ity. Id.
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subsequent civil enforcement proceeding.97 Finally, the failure to
support a child could result in criminal prosecution. In such a pro-
ceeding, an earlier paternity action may have already established
the question of paternity.98
The court indicated that the entry of the state, with all its re-
sources, on the side of the mother, had altered the balance between
the opposing parties. Because the district attorney's office prose-
cuted the action, the defendant was "at a distinct disadvantage in
facing the severe consequences of a paternity judgment. Unlike the
ordinary civil litigant, [the defendant was] opposed by the full re-
sources of the state, marshalled on the plaintiffs' behalf."9
The court believed that the decision reached under these condi-
tions was both unfair and unreliable. The court noted that because
of the importance and complexity of the proceedings, the legisla-
ture had provided the mother with counsel. By not providing coun-
sel for the alleged father, however, the legislature had tipped the
balance between the two parties too far in favor of the mother.
According to the court, the chances of paternity being imposed on
an innocent man increased dramatically if, due to the lack of coun-
sel, the defendant offered no defense. 100
The state argued that paternity actions were like any other civil
proceeding in which no right to court-appointed counsel existed.
The court disagreed, distinguishing paternity actions from other
civil actions: "[I]n these cases the full power of the state is pitted
against an indigent person in an adjudication of the existence of a
fundamental biological relationship entailing serious financial, le-
gal and moral obligations."'1 1 As a result, to deny the defendant
appointed counsel, the state must show a compelling interest. The
court ruled that no such compelling interest was present.
The state argued further that it had a financial interest at
stake-the public expense of providing counsel-and that the pres-
ence of counsel would make identifying the father more difficult.
The court acknowledged the state's financial interest but ruled
that the state had no legitimate interest in imposing fatherhood on
97. Id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 7010(a) (West 1983)).
98. Id. at 28-29, 593 P.2d at 231, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 533-34.
99. Id. at 30, 593 P.2d at 231, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
100. Id. at 31, 593 P.2d at 232, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 535.
101. Id. at 32, 593 P.2d at 233, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
1989]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
an innocent person. The presence of counsel would make the fact-
finding process more accurate, thus "furthering the state's legiti-
mate interests in securing support for dependent children." 10 2 The
appointment of counsel would serve the interest of the child as
well. The child had an interest, not only in determining that some
man was his or her father, but in ensuring that the person chosen
was the correct man.103 Based on these factors, the court held that
when the state prosecutes a paternity action, due process required
that the state provide counsel to the putative father-defendant. 04
In Kennedy v. Wood,0 5 the Indiana Court of Appeals undertook
a somewhat different analysis and found that due process required
appointed counsel in a paternity action prosecuted by the state.
The court cited the statement in Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services'06 that in the absence of at least a potential deprivation of
physical liberty, no defendant has a right to appointed counsel.
Following the Lassiter analysis, a court must weigh the presump-
tion against appointed counsel against the factors listed in Ma-
thews v. Eldridge:07 "'the private interests at stake, the govern-
ment's interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to
erroneous decisions.' ",08 The court said that if the factors rebut
the Lassiter presumption, due process requires appointed
counsel.10 9
The Indiana court ruled that the private interests at stake were
substantial. Because of the resulting support obligation, the de-
102. Id. at 33, 593 P.2d at 233, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
103. The court noted that the "child's rights of support and inheritance against the father
are at issue, as well as his or her future obligation to support the father." Id. at 33, 593 P.2d
at 234, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
104. Id. at 34, 593 P.2d at 234, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 537. See also Reynolds v. Kimmons, 569
P.2d 799 (Alaska 1977) (similar holding based solely on ALASKA CONST. art I, § 7). A court
reached a similar result in Artibee v. Cheboygan Circuit Judge, 397 Mich. 54, 243 N.W.2d
248 (1976) (based on MICH. CONST., art. I, § 17). The court said that paternity actions are
quasi-criminal. But see Franks v. Mercer, 401 So. 2d 470, 472 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (discussed
infra note 125). The court in Artibee distinguished paternity actions from divorce proceed-
ings in which appointed counsel is generally not provided. The court said that paternity
actions, unlike divorce actions, often involved sharply disputed factual questions about the
relationship of the parties. 397 Mich. at 57-58, 243 N.W.2d at 249.
105. 439 N.E.2d 1367 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
106. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
107. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
108. 439 N.E.2d at 1369 (quoting Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27).
109. Id.
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fendant had a financial interest. He also had an interest in a cor-
rect adjudication because of the possibility that failure to make
support payments could result in jail, and because evidence used in
paternity proceedings could be used in subsequent criminal ac-
tions.1 ' The defendant also had an interest because of the funda-
mental nature of the parent-child relationship involved. The court
also noted the private interest of the child in an accurate adjudica-
tion of paternity."" The court said that the child's interest in accu-
racy was at least equal to that of the defendant.1 2
The court distinguished the state's interest from that of the de-
fendant and the child because the state's interest was primarily
financial. The state had an interest in finding any man to hold
financially liable."l 3 The state also wanted an economical determi-
nation and wished to avoid both the expense of appointed counsel
and the likelihood that the use of counsel would result in a length-
ened trial. The court found that "[w]hile these pecuniary interests
are legitimate, they are hardly significant enough to overcome the
compelling private interests of the putative father and child."" 4
In analyzing the risk that the state procedure would lead to erro-
neous results, the court first noted that the legislature, recognizing
the complexity and importance of the proceedings, had provided
the mother with counsel. The court found that providing counsel
for the mother increased the risk that fatherhood would be im-
posed on the wrong man." 5 Furthermore, the fact-sensitive nature
of the proceedings and the importance of blood tests increased the
need for the assistance of counsel. The court cited Little v.
Streater,"6 which held that an indigent defendant in a paternity
110. Also, if attempts are later made to hold the defendant in civil contempt, the pater-
nity judgment would be res judicata in such a proceeding. Id. at 1370.
111. The court noted the various effects of a paternity action on the child: the child's
right of support, inheritance, and custody; the child's health interest in an accurate family
medical history; the possibility that the father may assert rights to custody and must give
consent to the adoption of the child; and the fact that the father's providing the child with
support gives the father a cause of action against the child for the father's own support,
which can be enforced by contempt and result in criminal liability. Id. at 1370-71.
112. Id. at 1371.
113. The court noted that the state seldom requested blood tests because they were ex-
pensive and would not help its cause. Id. at 1371 n.8.
114. Id. at 1371.
115. Id.
116. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
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suit was entitled to a blood test at state expense. The court said
that this right would be meaningless without counsel to advise the
defendant that he has such a right and to ensure that the test re-
sults are admitted into evidence properly.117
The court emphasized that paternity actions were similar in im-
portance to proceedings to terminate parental rights, in which the
Indiana legislature had provided for the appointment of counsel.
In comparing the two types of actions the court said:
Certainly the same considerations, the nature of the right in
question and the relative power of the antagonists, are as appli-
cable and as important in the creation of the parent-child rela-
tionship as they are in the parental rights termination case. We
find no compelling State interest to justify a denial of the same
fair opportunity to be heard by the indigent paternity defend-
ant. The private interests and the likelihood of erroneous results
in the current procedures used outweigh the State's financial in-
terest and are sufficient to overcome the presumption earlier
noted. 118
Some courts have chosen not to adopt a per se rule in paternity
cases and have instead held that appointed counsel is constitution-
ally required only in certain cases. In Wake County ex rel. Car-
rington v. Townes,"19 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
indigent defendants do not have an absolute right to appointed
counsel in paternity cases; instead, the decision to appoint counsel
must be made on a case-by-case basis.2 0
Noting the lack of an absolute right, the court stated that the
purpose of the paternity proceeding is to determine whether the
defendant is the child's father. Even if a court determines that the
defendant is the father, the defendant will not be imprisoned at
117. 439 N.E.2d at 1371-72. The court cited three studies to establish the importance of
this scientific evidence. One study found that 95% of all paternity disputes result in a find-
ing of paternity. Another found that out of 1000 cases studied, blood tests showed 39.6% of
the men not to be the father. In another study blood tests proved that 18% of a group of
accused men who acknowledged paternity were not the fathers of the children in question.
H. KRAUSE., ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 149-51 (1971).
118. 439 N.E.2d at 1372.
119. 306 N.C. 333, 293 S.E.2d 95 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1113 (1983).
120. Id. at 335, 293 S.E.2d at 97.
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the conclusion of the hearing on that basis.121 The court found the
possibilit of the defendant's subsequent imprisonment for failure
to make support payments too remote a possibility to require ap-
pointed counsel in all cases.
The court ruled that an appointment was required "'only in
those cases where assistance of counsel is necessary for an ade-
quate presentation of the merits, or to otherwise ensure fundamen-
tal fairness.' ",122 When a motion is made to appoint counsel, the
trial judge should evaluate the vital interests at stake and deter-
mine the complexity of the particular case and the nature of the
defendant's peculiar problems in presenting his own defense with-
out the assistance of counsel. The trial judge must then weigh the
factors against the Lassiter presumption that the defendant is not
entitled to appointed counsel in a proceeding that poses no imme-
diate threat to his physical liberty.123
Other courts, for various reasons, have found no right to counsel
in paternity actions. In State v. Walker,124 the Supreme Court of
Washington declined to find such a right because the defendant
would not be imprisoned as a result of the paternity action.125 In
State ex. rel Adult & Family Services Division v. Stoutt,12 the
121. "As we have stated many times, the mere begetting of a child, standing alone, is not
a crime in this State." Id. at 336, 293 S.E.2d at 98.
122. Id. at 339, 293 S.E.2d at 99 (quoting Jolly v. Wright, 300 N.C. 83, 93, 265 S.E.2d 135,
143 (1980)).
123. Id. at 340-41, 293 S.E.2d at 100. The court ruled that the trial judge had failed to
conduct such an analysis and remanded the case. Id. at 341-42, 293 S.E.2d at 101. In Hepfel
v. Bradshaw, 279 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. 1979), the Minnesota Supreme Court held, pursuant to
its supervisory power, that indigent defendants were entitled to appointed counsel in pater-
nity actions. The court specifically noted that the Constitution did not require appointed
counsel in this case. After analyzing the interests at stake and noting the presence of the
state on one side of the action, however, it ruled that fundamental fairness required ap-
pointed counsel for the other side as well. The court urged the legislature to take steps to
make paternity actions less adversarial in nature. Id. at 348.
124. 87 Wash. 2d 443, 553 P.2d 1093 (1976).
125. "The purposes of a filiation action are two: (1) determination of paternity; and (2)
imposition of a support obligation if the accused is found to be the father of the child.
Never is a deprivation or restriction of liberty a direct result of a filiation proceeding." Id. at
445, 553 P.2d at 1095. A court reached a similar result in Franks v. Mercer, 401 So. 2d 470
(La. Ct. App. 1981). There the court stated that paternity actions were not quasi-criminal in
nature. Id. at 472. But see Artibee v. Cheboygan Circuit Judge, 397 Mich. 54, 243 N.W.2d
248 (1976) (discussed supra note 104).
126. 57 Or. App. 303, 644 P.2d 1132 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 928 (1983).
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Oregon Court of Appeals also declined to find a right to counsel in
a paternity action. The court found that the factual and legal is-
sues involved in the case were simple and that an attorney could
have had little effect on the outcome. 1 7
Courts should handle paternity actions and termination proceed-
ings similarly. The presumption should favor appointed counsel
unless the state can show that, because of the particular legal and
factual issues involved, appointing counsel would not affect the
outcome. Given the availability and possible complexity of the sci-
entific evidence in the cases, the state will not often be able to
overcome the presumption. If the putative father contests the ac-
tion, the state should be required to show that a blood test would
not preclude a finding of paternity.
Divorce Actions
Divorce actions present another situation in which litigants have
argued, albeit unsuccessfully, for a right to appointed counsel.128 In
Kiddie v. Kiddie,'129 an indigent defendant in a divorce action con-
tended that he had a right to appointed counsel. 30 The Supreme
Court of Oklahoma stated that the right to counsel generally does
not extend to civil proceedings even when the proceedings may
have a great impact on the litigants.' 3 '
127. Id. at -, 644 P.2d at 1137. The court noted that it did not decide whether due
process ever required the appointment of counsel in a filiation proceeding. Id. at - n.7, 644
P.2d at 1137 n.7. The fact that the court conducted a Lassiter-Eldridge analysis could sug-
gest that, in a proper case, such a right would exist.
128. Generally, this argument is based on Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
Connecticut required the payment of court fees and costs for service of process as a condi-
tion for filing a divorce suit. Plaintiffs argued that this denied them access to the courts.
The Court held that because of the importance of the marriage relationship and the fact
that only the state could grant a divorce, due process did not permit a state to deny access
to its courts for those seeking a divorce solely because of inability to pay. Id. at 374.
129. 563 P.2d 139 (Okla. 1977).
130. Id. at 141. The court first noted that because the defendant had not been charged
with a crime, the sixth amendment did not apply; rather, his claim must be grounded in the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
131. Id. The court cited several situations in which the right to counsel had been denied
in civil cases: at a court-ordered psychiatric hearing, United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976); at a labor union hearing, Smith v. General
Truck Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local 467, 181 F. Supp. 14 (S.D. Cal. 1960);
at a hearing before a local draft board, United States v. Sturgis, 342 F.2d 328 (3rd Cir.),
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The court noted that other courts have granted the right to
counsel in child custody hearings. The court distinguished that sit-
uation by saying that in child custody hearings, the state, with all
its resources, was the opposing party, but in divorce actions an-
other private individual opposed the defendant. Given that no ab-
solute constitutional right to a divorce exists, 32 the court held that
the state and federal constitutions did not grant a right to counsel
in divorce cases.13 3
In Parsley v. Knuckles,134 the indigent defendant argued that
the trial court could not render a judgment of divorce without first
appointing counsel for him. The Kentucky Court of Appeals found
no right to appointed counsel in divorce actions. The court said
that at common law, counsel was not required in civil cases and
that the legislature was responsible for changing this situation. 3 '
These decisions are probably correct. Because another private
party opposes the indigent party in divorce actions, the state has
not taken action to aid one party to the detriment of the other. In
the absence of special circumstances, such as when mental incapac-
ity deprives a party of the ability to represent himself, courts
should treat divorce actions like other civil actions in which no
right to appointed counsel exists.
Civil Contempt
Indigent defendants have also sought appointed counsel in civil
contempt actions. Some courts have held that when the defendant
is faced with the possibility of imprisonment as a result of a civil
contempt action, he has an absolute right to appointed counsel.
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); and at a hearing concerning dentistry licensing, Bancroft
v. Board of Governors of Registered Dentists, 202 Okla. 108, 210 P.2d 666 (1949).
132. 563 P.2d at 142.
133. In response to the argument based on Boddie that the defendant was denied access
to the courts, the court said that in Kiddie the defendant did appear, albeit pro se.
134. 346 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1961).
135. Id. at 3. A somewhat related type of judicial deference was present in In re Smiley,
36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975). There, the Court of Appeals of New
York found no right to counsel in divorce actions, and indicated that the lack of a legislative
appropriation to cover payment for appointed counsel supported its decision. The court
seemed reluctant to interfere with the uniquely legislative power of the purse.
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In Otton v. Zaborac,136 the defendant was jailed as a result of his
failure to pay child support. The Alaska Supreme Court stated
that although contempt for nonsupport was traditionally civil, cer-
tain aspects of the action, particularly the threat of imprisonment,
make the action resemble a criminal proceeding. Although the pur-
pose of the proceeding for nonsupport is to provide a remedy for a
private party, disobedience of a court order is contempt of court."3 7
The state thus has a role in the proceeding. 3 " The court noted that
it had held consistently that a person facing a possible deprivation
of liberty must have all the fundamental rights the federal and
state constitutions guaranteed. Additionally, the right to counsel
applied to criminal, juvenile, and criminal contempt proceedings.
The court ruled that the potential deprivation of liberty in non-
support contempt proceedings was as serious as the deprivation in
criminal, juvenile, and criminal contempt proceedings. 3 ' As a re-
sult, a court must appoint counsel for an indigent defendant in-
volved in a nonsupport contempt proceeding. 40
Other courts have held that although defendants have no abso-
lute right to counsel in civil contempt actions, what due process
requires should be a case-by-case determination. In Duval v.
Duval, 4' the defendant was involved in a nonsupport civil con-
tempt hearing. The defendant argued first that the decision in
Argersinger v. Hamlin'42 granted the right to counsel in any crimi-
nal action in which the defendant could be imprisoned. The de-
136. 525 P.2d 537 (Alaska 1974).
137. Id. at 538-39.
138. Id. at 539. The court also noted that appearance at a contempt hearing is compul-
sory and that "[jimprisonment to coerce compliance is a remedy supplied by the state
through both its judicial machinery and its penal institutions." Id.
139. Id. The court quoted the opinion of the California Supreme Court in In re Harris, 69
Cal. 2d 486, _, 446 P.2d 148, 152, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340, 344 (1968): "A defendant who is de-
prived of his liberty by civil process is as much entitled to due process of law as a defendant
who is deprived of his liberty because he is charged with crime."
140. 525 P.2d at 540. The court also said that the defendant's right to a jury trial, with its
increased complexity, increased the need for counsel. Id. A court reached a similar result in
Tetro v. Tetro, 86 Wash. 2d 252, -, 544 P.2d 17, 19 (1975) ("Whatever due process requires
when other types of deprivation of liberty are potentially involved, when a judicial proceed-
ing may result in the defendant being physically incarcerated, counsel is required regardless
of whether the trial is otherwise 'criminal' in nature.").
141. 114 N.H. 422, 322 A.2d 1 (1974).
142. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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fendant urged the court to extend this rule to civil contempt pro-
ceedings when failure to comply with the court order could also
result in imprisonment. 143 The New Hampshire Supreme Court re-
fused, however, distinguishing civil contempt cases from criminal
contempt proceedings. The court said that a civil contempt action
arises out of a private wrong in which the defendant harms the
plaintiff by his failure to comply with a court order. The purpose is
to use the court's power to impose sanctions as a means of securing
the defendant's compliance. 4
In contrast to a civil contempt action, a criminal contempt ac-
tion arises out of a defendant's interference with the court's pro-
cess or dignity. This interference is considered to be a criminal or a
public wrong and the sanction imposed is punitive, rather than re-
medial. The court said that "[g]iven this distinction, it is apparent
that the sixth amendment right to counsel as set forth in
Argersinger is inapplicable to a civil contempt action because that
right is confined to criminal proceedings."145
The defendant then argued that the due process guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment required the court to appoint counsel.
The court cited the principle in Gagnon v. Scarpelli'46 that the
availability of appointed counsel in a proceeding involving the dep-
rivation of liberty would be decided on a case-by-case basis; ap-
pointment of counsel would depend on such factors as the capabil-
ity of the defendant to speak for himself, the character of the
proceedings, and the complexity of the issues. According to the
New Hampshire court, Gagnon required the appointment of coun-
sel only when the defendant would be treated unfairly if counsel
were not provided.14 7 The court held that "the trial court may in
its discretion appoint counsel to assist an indigent defendant to
143. 114 N.H. at -, 322 A.2d at 2.
144. In effect, the defendant carries the keys to his prison in his own pocket. Id. at -,
322 A.2d at 3.
145. Id. at -, 322 A.2d at 3. The defendant also attempted to rely on N.H. CONST. pt. 1,
art. 15 ("Every person held to answer in any crime or offense punishable by deprivation of
liberty shall have the right to counsel at the expense of the State if need is shown."). Citing
the record of the constitutional convention, the court said that "'offenses' refers to public,
not private wrongs." 114 N.H. at , 322 A.2d at 3.
146. 411 U.S. 778, 790-91 (1973).
147. 114 N.H. at , 322 A.2d at 4 (1974).
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present his case in a complicated nonsupport contempt hearing. 1 48
If the issues are not complex, however, the trial court is not obli-
gated to appoint counsel.149
The approach in Duval v. Duval'50 is the proper one. A defend-
ant could face imprisonment as a result of a civil contempt hear-
ing. A defendant should, however, have the power to free himself
by complying with the court's order. Also, a private individual
prosecutes a civil contempt action, the state becoming involved
only for enforcement purposes. Unlike termination proceedings
and paternity actions, therefore, the state has not entered the liti-
gation on behalf of one side. The lack of state involvement and the
ability of the defendant to purge himself of the contempt make it
reasonable to require that a court appoint counsel only in cases
that are sufficiently complex to make it fundamentally unfair to
require the defendant to represent himself. Further, if the defend-
ant claims an inability to comply with a court order because of lack
of funds and this claim is colorable, the court should appoint coun-
sel to aid in the presentment of this claim.
148. Id. at -, 322 A.2d at 4. See Jolly v. Wright, 300 N.C. 83, 93, 265 S.E.2d 135, 143
(1980) ("due process requires appointment of counsel for indigents in nonsupport civil con-
tempt proceedings only in those cases where assistance of counsel is necessary for an ade-
quate presentation of the merits, or to otherwise ensure fundamental fairness").
149. The court found the record insufficient to judge the complexity of the issues and
remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether due process required the appoint-
ment of counsel. 114 N.H. at _ 322 A.2d at 4. In Sheedy v. Merrimack County Superior
Court, 128 N.H. 51, 509 A.2d 144 (1986), the court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it failed to appoint counsel for a defendant jailed for contempt. The court
said that the defendant "has failed to convince us that the issues in this contempt proceed-
ing are sufficiently complex or that he is so incapable of speaking for himself that the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing to appoint counsel." Id. at -, 509 A.2d at 148. The
defendant contended that Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981), de-
cided subsequent to the decision in Duval, created a presumption that any indigent litigant
is entitled to appointed counsel whenever he faces imprisonment. The New Hampshire
court ruled that the discussion of such a presumption in Lassiter was merely dicta. The
court stated further that even if Lassiter created such a presumption, the presumption was
rebutted here because of the nature of the threatened imprisonment:
[Defendant] will be imprisoned only if he is in contempt. He will be in con-
tempt only if he fails to make a court-ordered payment. Finally he will be
ordered to make payments only if the court finds that he has the "ability to
pay." In such a situation, it can fairly be said that [defendant], if incarcerated,
will hold the keys to his own prison.
128 N.H. at _ 509 A.2d at 148.
150. 114 N.H. 422, 322 A.2d 1 (1974).
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28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
Under a federal statute, trial courts have the power to appoint
counsel for plaintiffs.18 ' This opportunity to have court-appointed
counsel, however, is a privilege, not a right. 1 2 The decision to ap-
point counsel is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial
court.15 3 In Maclin v. Freake,5 the plaintiff, an indigent prisoner,
alleged that a prison administrator had been deliberately indiffer-
ent to his serious medical needs in violation of his rights under the
eighth amendment. The district court denied the plaintiff's request
for appointed counsel. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit acknowledged that under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) the
district court has broad discretion to appoint counsel and that the
denial of counsel "will not be overturned unless it would result in
fundamental unfairness impinging on due process rights.' 155 The
court said that the district court's decision must "rest upon the
court's careful consideration of all the circumstances of the case,
with particular emphasis upon certain factors that have been rec-
ognized as highly relevant to a request for counsel."'' 5 The court
then listed and described these factors.
Initially, the trial court should consider the merits of the plain-
tiff's claim. The court stated that even in cases in which the plain-
tiff's claim is not frivolous, appointment of counsel is often unwar-
ranted if the plaintiff's chances of success are extremely slim. 57
Once the claim is determined to be colorable, the trial court should
consider the nature of the factual issues it raises. If the plaintiff is
151. "The court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to employ
counsel ... ." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982).
152. United States v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1965).
153. Id.
154. 650 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1981).
155. Id. at 886.
156. Id. at 887.
157. Quoting another decision, the court said that:
"[T]he general rule seems to be that, before the Court is justified in exercising
its discretion in favor of an appointment, it must first appear that the claim
has some merit in fact and law... Were it otherwise, the appointment in most
instances would work a hardship on counsel with no concomitant benefit to the
party requesting it."
Id. (quoting Spears v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 22, 25-26 (S.D. W. Va. 1967)).
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in no position to investigate crucial facts, a court should appoint
counsel.15
8
The court stated that the trial court should next examine
whether the search for truth will be better served if both sides are
represented by persons trained in the presentation of evidence and
in cross-examination. 159 Counsel may be required when the only
evidence available to the factfinder is conflicting testimony. 160
Courts have declined to appoint counsel when the factual issues
are uncomplicated or insubstantial and thus do not require "the
aid of experienced trial counsel to sift through a complicated rec-
ord or to take testimony."''
Next, the district court should consider the capability of the
plaintiff to present his case. The court of appeals quoted Gordon v.
Leeke: 6 2 "'If it is apparent to the district court that a pro se liti-
gant has a colorable claim but lacks the capacity to present it, the
district court should appoint counsel to assist him.' ""' The court
said that, in contrast, when the plaintiff appears competent to pre-
sent the claim, courts have declined to appoint counsel.
Finally, the district court should consider the complexity of the
legal issues the claim raises. When the law is so clearly settled that
counsel will serve no purpose, the court should deny a request for
counsel. When, however, the law is not clear, justice will be better
served if both sides are represented by persons trained in legal
analysis. 64
The court then applied these factors to the case before it. The
plaintiff presented a colorable claim by alleging a violation of his
158. Id.
159. Id. at 888.
160. Id. The court cited Manning v. Lockhart, 623 F.2d 536, 540 (8th Cir. 1980), in which
the Eight Circuit held that refusing to appoint counsel in a case "where there is a question
of credibility of witnesses and where the case presents serious allegations of facts which are
not facially frivolous" was an abuse of discretion. 650 F.2d at 888.
161. 650 F.2d at 888 (quoting United States v. Meyer, 222 F. Supp. 845, 848 (E.D. Pa.
1963), afl'd, 326 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1964)).
162. 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).
163. 650 F.2d at 888 (quoting Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d at 1153)).
164. Id. at 889.
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eighth amendment rights.l 5 According to the court, the plaintiff
was in no position to investigate facts relevant to his complaint:
Confined to a wheelchair and in constant pain, he can hardly be
thought capable of conducting an adequate examination of his
own medical records, let alone of developing evidence of the
medical treatment he ought to have received. Should his case go
to trial, we think he will need an attorney to elicit relevant, com-
prehensible testimony that will elucidate for the factfinder the
treatment he received and the adequacy of that treatment.'6 6
The court also noted the plaintiff did not appear to have a working
knowledge of the legal process.' The court concluded that the
district court abused its discretion when it failed to appoint coun-
sel for the plaintiff.'
165. The plaintiff presented evidence that he was a paraplegic and had not received any
physical therapy for 11 months. Id.
166. Id.
167. When the defendant filed a motion for dismissal or summary judgment, the plaintiff
made no attempt to contest the motion by showing genuine issues of material fact. Id.
168. Id. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied this test in a similar case in Mer-
ritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1983). In Merritt, the plaintiff sought declaratory
and injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages for the failure to provide him
with proper medical treatment in violation of the eighth amendment. Id. at 763. The district
court declined to appoint counsel, but the court of appeals reversed, saying that the refusal
was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 761. The court decided: (1) that the plaintiff presented a
colorable claim for relief in that he made allegations which, if proved, would show a viola-
tion of his rights and entitle him to relief; (2) that the plaintiff's blindness prevented him
from investigating crucial facts; (3) that the evidence would consist of complex and contra-
dictory testimony from medical experts, the plaintiff, and the defendant, and that to test
this testimony and its credibility would require the skills of a trained advocate; (4) that the
plaintiff was unable to present his case properly; and (5) that the legal questions raised by
the case were too complex to be handled by a lay person. Id. at 765. Judge Posner dissented
on the appointment of counsel issue, saying that "a prisoner who has a good damages suit
should be able to hire a competent lawyer and ... by making the prisoner go this route we
subject the probable merit of his case to the test of the market." Id. at 769 (Posner, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Posner indicated that a person with a good
claim on the merits should have no difficulty obtaining an attorney willing to take the case
on a contingency fee. Judge Cudahy took issue with Judge Posner's analysis, indicating that
the fact that the plaintiff was incarcerated might have had an adverse effect on his ability to
retain counsel:
Perhaps, however, the laws of economics take a different turn when prison
walls intervene. Not entirely facetiously, it occurs to me that the barriers to
entry into the prison litigation market might be very high. I think our knowl-
edge of the state of effective competition among attorneys for the business of
prisoners with legal claims is slight. Hence, I am not prepared to consign to the
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The analysis the court used is entirely reasonable. When the in-
digent plaintiff has a weak claim, the legal and factual issues are
clear, or the plaintiff is quite capable of investigating and present-
ing his own case, the appointment of counsel is unnecessary. When
these factors are not present, however, the court should be willing
to appoint counsel to the extent that it will enable a determination
of the merits of the plaintiff's claim.
Civil Rights Cases
Indigents, usually prisoners, bringing cases under the civil rights
statutes have also attempted to obtain appointed counsel. 169 In
Craigo v. Hey,7 the plaintiff, an indigent prisoner, brought a suit
alleging personal injuries in violation of his civil rights. The West
Virginia Supreme Court found no constitutional or statutory right
to counsel in all civil cases. The court stated that, "[n]evertheless,
particularly when rights of a constitutional dimension are at stake,
a poor person's access to the federal courts must not be turned into
an exercise in futility.'' In fact, both Congress 7 2 and the West
Virginia Legislature 7 had indicated that the courts must be avail-
able to both the rich and the poor. 74
The court said that "[a]ppointment of counsel in civil rights
cases is discretionary and warranted only in exceptional circum-
stances.' 7 5 However, civil rights cases were often complex, the
court noted; thus, "where a pro se litigant has a colorable claim
but lacks capacity to present it, the court should appoint counsel
verdict of the marketplace the issue of prisoner representation; and this is, of
course, not the law.
Id. at 769 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
169. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
170. 345 S.E.2d 814 (W. Va. 1986).
171. Id. at 817.
172. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982).
173. See W. VA. CODE § 59-2-1 (1966):
A poor person may be allowed by a court to sue or defend a suit therein with-
out paying fees, or costs, whereupon he shall have from any counsel which the
court may assign him and from all officers, all needful services and process, and
also the assistance of witnesses, without any fees to them therefor, except what
may be included in the costs recoverable from the opposite party.
Id.
174. 345 S.E.2d at 817-18.
175. Id. at 820. See Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1982).
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to assist him to prepare his complaint. ' 17 6 Once an indigent plain-
tiff files a pro se petition requesting appointed counsel, the trial
court should apply the test used in Merritt v. Faulkner7 7 to decide
whether to appoint counsel to prepare the complaint:
"(1) [W]hether the merits of the indigent's claim are colorable;
(2) the ability of the indigent plaintiff to investigate crucial
facts; (3) whether the nature of the evidence indicates that the
truth will more likely be exposed where both sides are repre-
sented by counsel; (4) the capability of the indigent litigant to
present the case; and (5) the complexity of the legal issues
raised by the complaint."'7
In Whisenant v. Yuam,17 a plaintiff brought suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging police misconduct in preventing him from
obtaining medical treatment. The district court denied the plain-
tiff's repeated requests for appointed counsel because federal funds
were not available to compensate counsel for section 1983 suits. 80
The plaintiff claimed that he was barely able to read and write and
had no experience with law or legal procedures. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court
had abused its discretion by refusing to appoint counsel.'
The court of appeals found the circumstances in this case excep-
tional. The plaintiff had a colorable claim because he had alleged
facts, which if proved would entitle him to relief. Once the plaintiff
has established a colorable claim, the existence of exceptional cir-
176. 345 S.E.2d at 820.
177. 697 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1983).
178. 345 S.E.2d at 820-21 (quoting Merritt, 697 F.2d at 764). The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals listed a similar set of factors in Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1982).
In Ulmer, an indigent prisoner brought a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of
his civil rights because of inadequate and unsanitary jail conditions. The court said that
although counsel in civil rights cases was required only in exceptional cases, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(d) allows a federal court the discretion to appoint counsel if doing so would advance
the proper administration of justice. In determining whether the case is an exceptional one,
the court said that the district court should consider: (1) the type and complexity of the
case; (2) whether the plaintiff is capable of adequately presenting his case; (3) whether the
plaintiff is in a position to investigate the case adequately; and (4) whether the evidence will
consist in large part of conflicting testimony so as to require skill in the presentation of
evidence and in cross-examination. Id. at 213.
179. 739 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1984).
180. Id. at 162-63.
181. Id. at 162.
1989] 655
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
cumstances depends on the type and complexity of the case and
the abilities of the person bringing it.' 5 2 On this point the court
said:
[The plaintiff] is ill-equipped to represent himself or to litigate
a claim of this nature. He is relatively uneducated generally and
totally uneducated in legal matters. He cannot leave prison to
interview witnesses such as the doctors who eventually attended
him. His version of events... is in sharp conflict with that of
the defendants, so that the outcome of the case depends largely
on credibility. [The plaintiff] has no training in cross-
examination.'" 3
The court found that such exceptional circumstances were not
present in Lockert v. Faulkner,8 4 in which the plaintiff brought a
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state prison officials for refus-
ing to allow him to marry a non-inmate. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Indiana said that in deter-
mining whether to appoint counsel for the plaintiff, the court
should consider the standards established in Maclin v. Freake.18 5
The facts of the case were not in dispute and the legal issues were
clear. Nothing in the record indicated any mental or physical im-
pairment of the plaintiff that would hamper his presentation of his
claim. The court also noted the "generally good quality of the
plaintiff's pleadings, and the obvious care with which he has
framed and argued the legal questions raised."' 86 As a result, the
court denied the plaintiff's request for appointed counsel. 87
The possibility of recovering attorney's fees from the losing
party encourages attorneys to represent nonprisoners with colora-
ble constitutional claims. 88 However, when a prisoner brings the
182. Id. at 163.
183. Id. The court said that the failure to appoint counsel denied the plaintiff a funda-
mentally fair trail. The availability of federal funds was unrelated to the question of funda-
mental fairness. Id. at 163-64.
184. 574 F. Supp. 606, 608 (N.D. Ind. 1983).
185. 650 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1981). The standards include the legal and factual merits of
the claim, the complexity of the issues, and the plaintiff's intellectual and physical abilities
to present his case. 574 F. Supp. at 608. See supra notes 154-68 and accompanying text.
186. 574 F. Supp. at 608.
187. Id.
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (permits a trial court to award a reasonable attorney's
fee to the prevailing party in an action to enforce 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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suit, the possibility of recovering attorneys fees is not a sufficient
incentive. Given the isolation of many prisons, many attorneys will
not likely be willing to even discuss a case with the prisoner. In
these cases, if the inmate has a colorable claim and is unable to
represent himself, a court should appoint counsel to help the pris-
oner develop his claim. Once the claim is developed, relying on the
availability of attorney's fees to cause attorneys to undertake
claims with merit may be sufficient.
Tort Actions
The California Supreme Court has held, in some very limited
circumstances, that due process may require appointed counsel for
indigent defendants in tort actions. In Payne v. Superior Court,""9
an indigent prisoner was convicted of theft. While still incarcer-
ated, he was sued for damages arising out of the theft. The Depart-
ment of Corrections refused to permit him to attend the civil trial
and a default judgment was entered against him. 19°
The court noted that the claim involved due process and equal
protection issues, raising similar questions: "[W]e must determine
whether state action has infringed upon a fundamental right of pe-
titioner. If it has, the state action can be upheld only if necessary
to effect an overriding governmental interest." 91 Also, "the gov-
ernment must show that its interest cannot be satisfied by alterna-
tive methods less restrictive of the individual right abridged." 92
The court held that due process requires, at a minimum, that in
the absence of an overriding state interest, persons haled before a
court when their rights are at stake must be given a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.'93
189. 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976).
190. The supreme court first ruled that the defendant's contention that he was denied
access to the courts was not affected by a California statute once referred to as a "'civil
death' statute." CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600 (West 1983). "'[P]risoners, while forfeiting, as a
necessary corollary of prison life, significant rights and privileges enjoyed by the general
populace, retain those basic rights which are not incompatible with the running of the penal
institution.'" 17 Cal. 3d at 913, 553 P.2d at 569, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 409 (quoting Newkirk v.
Butler, 364 F. Supp. 497, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
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As a result of the litigation, the defendant had the potential of
losing property that he already owned or might acquire in the fu-
ture. The court found this interest in property to be fundamen-
tal."" The state's interests in not providing counsel and not al-
lowing the defendant to attend his trial were not compelling
enough in the face of the defendant's fundamental property right.
Given defendant's fundamental right and the lack of a compelling
state interest, denying him the opportunity to be heard in his own
defense was a denial of due process and equal protection. 195 The
court also said that "denial of appointed counsel to an indigent
prisoner, when no other relief will preserve his right of access to
the courts, is constitutionally impermissible.'
' 96
The court then described the limited circumstances in which ap-
pointed counsel was required:
We do not rule that appointment of counsel is an absolute
right. However, it is in many instances the only remedy enabling
a prisoner to obtain access to the courts. The access right, in
turn, comes into existence only when a prisoner is confronted
with a bona fide legal action threatening his interests. If a pris-
oner is merely a nominal defendant with nothing of consequence
at stake, no need emerges for an appointed attorney. Thus,
before appointing counsel for a defendant prisoner in a civil suit
the trial court should determine first whether the prisoner is in-
digent. If he is indigent and the court decides that a continuance
is not feasible, it should then ascertain whether the prisoner's
interests are actually at stake in the suit and whether an attor-
ney would be helpful to him under the circumstances of the
case. The latter determination should be comparatively simple:
if the prisoner is not contesting the suit against him, or any as-
pect of it, there is no need for counsel; but if he plans to defend
194. The court ruled that although the defendant was indigent and had nothing to lose at
present, statutes provided that the judgment could be enforced against him on his future
earnings and acquisitions. Id. at 914 n.4, 553 P.2d at 571 n.4, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 411 n.4.
195. The court based its decision on the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution and the California Constitution. Id. at 922-23, 553 P.2d at 576, 132 Cal. Rptr.
at 416.
196. Id. at 924, 553 P.2d at 576, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
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the action and an adverse judgment would affect his present or
future property rights, an attorney should be appointed.19
A factor involved in tort litigation may be the contingent fee sys-
tem. A plaintiff with a colorable claim but without funds may be
able to obtain counsel by agreeing to share the recovery. Counsel
will probably be more willing to share the risks in hopes of ob-
taining a large reward.
An indigent defendant, however, does not have this benefit. Be-
cause he is the defendant, and not the plaintiff, the success of his
suit will not result in a monetary reward. The system, then, may
result in unfairness to an indigent defendant. 9 On the other hand,
an indigent plaintiff who for some reason is unable to obtain coun-
sel may decide to handle the case himself. Providing an indigent
defendant with counsel in such a case would result in great unfair-
ness to an indigent plaintiff.
197. Id. at 924, 553 P.2d at 576-77, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 416-17. The court went to great
pains to emphasize the limits of its holding:
We have not ruled that all indigents have a right to counsel in civil cases. Nor
have we established that indigent prisoners who are plaintiffs in civil actions
may secure appointed counsel or the right to appear personally ... All we
decide is that when a prisoner is threatened with a judicially sanctioned depri-
vation of his property, due process and equal protection require a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. How that is to be achieved is to be determined by the
exercise of discretion by the trial court.
Id. at 926-27, 553 P.2d at 578-79, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 418-19.
The court was called upon to apply this holding in Yarbrough v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.
3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985). In Yarbrough, the defendant was sued for
wrongful death arising out of a shooting for which he was imprisoned. The court expanded
on the criteria listed in Payne. First, an adverse judgment must affect property rights. The
court ruled that the trial court should evaluate the potential for loss to the prisoner, weigh-
ing factors such as the defendant's age, term of imprisonment, employment history, educa-
tion, skills, family background, and the likelihood of his inheriting property. Second, counsel
must be helpful to the defendant under the circumstances of his case. The court should
consider whether undetermined issues of fact exist. The conviction could be admissible at
the civil trial and collateral estoppel could prohibit the relitigation of issues decided in the
criminal case. Even if no new factual issues remain, the court should consider the question
of damages. The court should consider whether other defendants are jointly and severally
liable, and likely to be required to pay the judgment. The final factor is whether a court can
provide access by granting a continuance until the defendant is released from custody. The
court found that the trial court failed to consider these factors and remanded the case. Id.
at 206-07, 702 P.2d at 589, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
198. One might question how much a truly indigent defendant could actually lose as the
result of a judgment against him in a tort suit. A plaintiff may name an indigent as a de-
fendant to obtain the benefits of whatever insurance coverage the defendant might have.
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In a perfect world, providing counsel for indigent defendants in
cases in which an indigent plaintiff has counsel might be better.
Given the high cost of such a system, however, this result is not
practical. The contingency fee system may work an unfairness on
indigent defendants; an unfairness that perhaps must be tolerated.
The cases in which indigent tort defendants receive appointed
counsel should be exceedingly rare ones, probably restricted to
cases in which prison authorities prohibit inmates from attending
the trial and representing themselves.
REVERSING THE Lassiter PRESUMPTION: A NEW APPROACH TO
WHEN DUE PROCESS REQUIRES APPOINTED COUNSEL
Although appointed counsel in civil cases is not unheard of, the
preceding cases demonstrate that it is the exception rather than
the rule. In the typical civil case, this treatment is appropriate. In
a tort action, when only property is at risk and the indigent party
is opposed by another private party, fundamental fairness does not
require that the state bear the great expense of providing ap-
pointed counsel. The California Supreme Court has held that in
some limited circumstances, due process may require appointed
counsel for an indigent prisoner who is a defendant in a tort ac-
tion.199 Such a situation is, however, a fairly unique one. The Cali-
fornia court relied heavily on the fact that the prisoner was not
permitted to attend his trial and present his own case. The indi-
gent prisoner thus could neither represent himself nor afford to
hire an attorney. He was denied any opportunity to be heard,
much less a meaningful opportunity. Under these circumstances,
due process does require that the state either allow the prisoner to
attend the trial and represent himself or appoint counsel for him.
In the normal tort action involving an unincarcerated defendant,
however, a litigant is free to attend and represent himself and due
process does not require appointed counsel. Although a litigant
who cannot afford an attorney undoubtedly will be at a disadvan-
tage vis-A-vis an opponent who has sufficient funds to retain coun-
sel, this disadvantage is simply part of the unfairness that life
provides.
199. Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976). See
supra notes 189-97 and accompanying text.
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Due process also does not require appointed counsel for indigent
litigants charged with civil contempt. The decision to appoint
counsel in a noncriminal proceeding in which a potential depriva-
tion of liberty exists, such as in a civil contempt action, should be a
case-by-case determination, depending on the capability of the de-
fendant to speak for himself, the character of the proceedings and
the complexity of the issues. 00 When the issues are not complex,
and special circumstances do not make the defendant incapable of
speaking for himself, due process does not require appointed coun-
.sel.201 Normally, civil contempt defendants hold the key to the
prison in their pockets. They can purge themselves of their con-
tempt merely by complying with the court's order. Fundamental
fairness does not require appointed counsel for litigants who are in
a position to resolve their difficulty through their own actions. 202
Importantly, another private party prosecutes a civil contempt ac-
tion; the state becomes involved only through enforcement.
In cases brought under civil rights statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. §
1983, due process does not require appointed counsel for all indi-
gent litigants. Congress has provided that a court may award the
prevailing party attorney's fees.20 3 An indigent litigant with a col-
orable claim, but insufficient funds to retain counsel, then, should
be able to retain counsel because of the possibility of receiving at-
torney's fees. Courts have held that appointing counsel in a civil
rights case is discretionary and warranted only in exceptional
cases.204 Courts have ruled that some cases involving indigent pris-
oners meet this high standard.205 These cases involved incarcerated
200. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790-91 (1983).
201. Duval v. Duval, 114 N.H. 422, -, 322 A.2d 1, 3-4 (1974). See supra notes 141-49 and
accompanying text.
202. A court will only imprison a defendant if he is found in contempt. He will be in
contempt only if he fails to make a court-ordered payment and he will be ordered to make
such a payment only if the court finds he has the ability to pay. Sheedy v. Merrimack
County Superior Court, 128 N.H. 51, _ 509 A.2d 144, 148 (1986). A defendant can thus
remove any potential threat to his liberty merely by doing that which a court has already
found him to be capable of doing.
203. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
204. See Craigo v. Hey, 345 S.E.2d 814, 818 (W. Va. 1986).
205. See Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1984).
19891
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
plaintiffs and sharply contested issues of fact.20 6 When an analysis
of the relevant factors207 reveals an exceptional case, a court should
appoint counsel, at least for the purpose of helping the litigant
prepare his complaint.08 Based on the reported decisions, a case
would be exceptional only when the litigant is incarcerated. In
such a situation in which the litigant is unable to investigate his
own claim, the court should appoint counsel to help prepare the
complaint. Once a complaint is prepared, however, the provision
for attorney's fees should enable a litigant to obtain an attorney if
he has a meritorious claim. The unfairness to an impecunious liti-
gant in a civil rights action is largely eliminated or mitigated
through the provision for attorney's fees.
Yet, although the resulting unfairness to an impoverished liti-
gant is acceptable in the civil actions just described, in other civil
actions the unfairness is much greater and results in a denial of
due process. Constitutional problems arise when two factors are
present: the state is the opposing party and the interest that the
indigent litigant has at stake is more fundamental than his interest
in property.
These factors are present in proceedings to terminate parental
rights and in paternity actions. Generally, the opposing party in
these actions is the state, with its legal expertise and vast re-
sources, rather than another private party. Additionally, the right
that the litigant has at stake is much more fundamental than any
property interest at risk in most civil actions; it is the creation or
termination of the parent-child relationship.0 9
206. Cf. Lockert v. Faulkner, 574 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (declining to appoint
counsel for an indigent prisoner after determining that the facts of the case were not in
dispute).
207. In deciding whether the case is an exceptional one, the trial court should consider:
(1) the type and complexity of the case; (2) whether the plaintiff is capable of adequately
presenting his case; (3) whether the plaintiff is in a position to investigate his case ade-
quately; and (4) whether the evidence will consist in large part of conflicting testimony so as
to require skill in the presentation of evidence and in cross-examination. Ulmer v. Chancel-
lor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982).
208. Craigo, 345 S.E.2d at 820. Once a complaint is prepared, relying on the provision for
attorney's fees and the market to see that good damages claims are prosecuted may be
adequate.
209. "[A] parent's desire for and right to 'the companionship, care, custody, and manage-
ment of his or her children' is an important interest that 'undeniably warrants deference
and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.'" Lassiter v. Department of So-
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The importance of the interest at stake is not sufficient, standing
alone, to warrant a reversal of the Lassiter presumption, however.
In a civil contempt action, in which the interest is personal liberty,
the state has not acted to aid one party to the detriment of the
other and it is not required to appoint counsel to bring the parties
back into balance. Similarly, the importance of the liberty interest
at stake in a divorce action is arguably as great as the interest in
paternity and termination actions. In divorce actions, however, the
state has not provided one party with counsel. The entry of the
state on behalf of one side distinguishes divorce actions from pa-
ternity and termination actions.210 The state's decision to aid one
party justifies requiring the state to bear the financial burden of
providing counsel for the other party as well.
In fact, in termination and paternity actions, to send an unrepre-
sented person against the state is fundamentally unfair. The due
process requirement of a meaningful opportunity to be heard
would, in many cases, be a hollow promise to an indigent person
forced to cope with rules of evidence and unfamiliar procedures.
For the state to favor one litigant to the disadvantage of another,
especially when the interest at stake is such an important one, of-
fends due process.
In termination proceedings and paternity actions, due process
and fundamental fairness require a reversal of the Lassiter pre-
sumption against appointing counsel. Instead, a strong presump-
tion in favor of appointed counsel should arise in these situations.
To overcome this presumption, the state should have to make a
substantial showing that, because of the particular legal and fac-
tual issues involved, the presence of counsel would have no effect
on the outcome. For example, if a paternity action is contested, the
state should be required, at a minimum, to show that a blood test
would not preclude a finding of paternity. The Supreme Court has
held that a state may not deny a blood grouping test to an indigent
cial Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
"This Court frequently has stressed the importance of familial bonds, whether or not legiti-
mized by marriage, and accorded them constitutional protection.... Just as the termination
of such bonds demands procedural fairness .... so too does their imposition." Little v.
Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13 (1981) (citations omitted).
210. Kiddie v. Kiddie, 563 P.2d 139, 142 (Okla. 1977).
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paternity defendant because of his lack of financial resources.21' As
one court observed,212 an indigent's right to a free blood grouping
test would be of little value without counsel to advise him of his
right to demand a test and to ensure that the results are admitted
into evidence properly.213 Additionally, the trial judge who finds
that the presence of counsel would not affect the outcome should
have to set forth his reasons in the record to permit appellate
review.
This approach represents a compromise between criminal cases,
in which a court must appoint counsel before imprisoning a de-
fendant, and civil cases, in which a presumption against the ap-
pointment of counsel exists. The litigant's interest in paternity and
termination actions is less than his interest in his personal liberty,
at risk in a criminal case, but greater than his interest in property,
at risk in an ordinary civil action. Reversing the Lassiter presump-
tion in these actions reflects the midway position that the liberty
interest at risk in paternity and termination proceedings occupies
on a continuum of interests that can be at risk in litigation; a con-
tinuum that ranges from a litigant's interest in property to his in-
terest in his personal liberty. The importance of the litigant's in-
terest at stake in termination and paternity cases falls somewhere
between the importance of his interest at stake in criminal and
other civil cases. Similarly, the presumption in favor of appointing
counsel in paternity and termination actions falls somewhere be-
tween the per se approach to appointing counsel in criminal cases
and the presumption against appointing counsel in civil cases.
When the interest at stake is a very important one-the defend-
ant's personal liberty-the court will appoint counsel automati-
cally. When the litigant's interest is less important-his prop-
erty-a court will appoint counsel only in exceptional cases. When,
211. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 16-17.
212. See Kennedy v. Wood, 439 N.E.2d 1367, 1372-73 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
213. A joint study by the American Medical Association and the American Bar Associa-
tion has recommended that seven serologic systems be tested. The study found that such
tests would establish nonpaternity for 91-93% of all falsely accused men. American Medical
Assoc., Comm. on Transfusion & Transplantation, & American Bar Assoc., Section on Fam-
ily Law, Comm. on Standards for the Judicial Use of Scientific Evidence in the Ascertain-
ment of Paternity, Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: The Present Status of Serologic Testing in
Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247, 257 (1976).
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however, the litigant's interest is less important than his personal
liberty, but more important than his property, a court should ap-
point counsel, not automatically, but more as the rule than as the
exception.
Applying the Lassiter presumption to all types of civil cases
equates the interests at stake in all civil actions. The interests at
stake in paternity and termination actions, however, are compel-
ling and far-reaching and greatly outweigh the litigant's property
interest in typical civil litigation. Reversing the Lassiter presump-
tion will not require appointed counsel in every paternity action
and in every proceeding to terminate parental rights. Unlike crimi-
nal cases, in which a court appoints counsel even for defendants
who intend to plead guilty, a court need not appoint counsel in
paternity or termination actions unless those actions are contested.
Even when the actions are contested, a court need not appoint
counsel if the state can show that, because of the particular legal
and factual issues involved, appointing counsel would make no dif-
ference in the outcome. In a paternity action, then, if a blood test
indicated a high likelihood of paternity, a court need not appoint
counsel.
The cost to the state would fall somewhere between the cost
borne by the state in providing counsel for virtually all indigent
defendants in criminal cases and the cost the state bears in provid-
ing counsel for only a few defendants in most civil cases. In termi-
nation and paternity actions, the state would have to bear the cost
of providing counsel for many litigants, but not all litigants.
Undoubtedly, this approach could financially burden the states
and would likely prolong such proceedings. Compared to the inter-
ests of the private parties involved, however, the state interests are
insignificant. The state has chosen to intervene in favor of one
party in termination and paternity actions. Once the state has cho-
sen to favor one side of the litigation in this fashion, to refuse ap-
pointed counsel for the opposing party as well is fundamentally
unfair. Due process and fundamental fairness require that before
the state can establish or terminate a parent-child relationship, it
must provide its indigent opponent with counsel.
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CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has found a presumption
against appointing counsel for indigent civil litigants when the liti-
gant will not likely be deprived of his personal liberty if he is un-
successful in the litigation. Various courts have gone further, rec-
ognizing a right to counsel in paternity actions and proceedings to
terminate parental rights because of the state's presence as the op-
posing party and the important liberty interest at stake. A few
courts have held that indigent litigants have a right to counsel in
civil rights cases and civil contempt proceedings. One court has
found a limited right to counsel for defendants in tort actions.
Due process does not require appointed counsel for indigent civil
litigants in tort actions, civil rights actions, civil contempt proceed-
ings, and divorce actions. In these types of civil cases the Lassiter
presumption against appointing counsel is appropriate. In pater-
nity actions and in proceedings to terminate parental rights, how-
ever, due process and fundamental fairness require a reversal of
the presumption. Given the important liberty interests at stake in
such cases, and the entry of the state on behalf of one side of the
litigation, the state must restore the balance between the private
parties and provide counsel for the other side as well. The state
must do so unless it can demonstrate clearly that providing the
other side with counsel will have no effect on the outcome of the
litigation. Nothing less will satisfy the demands of due process.
William L. Dick, Jr.
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